16 research outputs found
A note on Low Order assumptions in RSA groups
In this short note, we show that substantially weaker Low Order assumptions are sufficient to prove the soundness of Pietrzak’s protocol for proof of exponentiation in groups of unknown order. This constitutes the first step to a better understanding of the asymptotic computational complexity of breaking the soundness of the protocol. Furthermore, we prove the equivalence of the (weaker) Low Order assumption(s) and the Factoring assumption in RSA groups for a non-negligible portion of moduli. We argue that in practice our reduction applies for a considerable amount of deployed moduli. Our results have cryptographic applications, most importantly in the theory of recently proposed verifiable delay function constructions. Finally, we describe how to certify RSA moduli free of low order elements
Towards Measuring The Fungibility and Anonymity of Cryptocurrencies
Cryptocurrencies aim to replicate physical cash in the digital realm while
removing centralized middlemen. Decentralization is achieved by the blockchain,
a permanent public ledger that contains a record of every transaction. The
public ledger ensures transparency, which enables public verifiability but
harms fungibility and anonymity. Even though cryptocurrencies attracted
millions of users in the last decade with their total market cap reaching
approximately one trillion USD, their anonymity guarantees are poorly
understood. Indeed, previous notions of privacy, anonymity, and fungibility for
cryptocurrencies are either non-quantitative or inapplicable, e.g.,
computationally hard to measure. In this work, we put forward a formal
framework to measure the fungibility and anonymity of cryptocurrencies,
allowing us to quantitatively reason about the mixing characteristics of
cryptocurrencies and the privacy-enhancing technologies built on top of them.
Our methods apply absorbing Markov chains combined with Shannon entropy. To the
best of our knowledge, our work is the first to assess the fungibility of
cryptocurrencies. Among other results, we find that in the studied one-week
interval, the Bitcoin network, on average, provided comparable but quantifiably
more fungibility than the Ethereum network.Comment: Pre-print. 23 page
ShareLock: Mixing for Cryptocurrencies from Multiparty ECDSA
Many cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, do not provide any financial privacy to their users. These systems cannot be used as a medium of exchange as long as they are transparent. Therefore the lack of privacy is the largest hurdle for cryptocurrency mass adoption next to scalability issues. Although many privacy-enhancing schemes had been already proposed in the literature, most of them did not get traction due to either their complexity or their adoption would rely on severe changes to the base protocol. To close this gap, in this work we propose ShareLock, a practical privacy-enhancing tool for cryptocurrencies which is deployable on today\u27s cryptocurrency networks
Behemoth: transparent polynomial commitment scheme with constant opening proof size and verifier time
Polynomial commitment schemes are fundamental building blocks in numerous cryptographic protocols such as verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments, and many more. The most efficient polynomial commitment schemes rely on a trusted setup which is undesirable in trust-minimized applications, e.g., cryptocurrencies. However, transparent polynomial commitment schemes are inefficient (polylogarithmic opening proofs and/or verification time) compared to their trusted counterparts. It has been an open problem to devise a transparent, succinct polynomial commitment scheme or prove an impossibility result in the transparent setting. In this work, for the first time, we create a transparent, constant-size polynomial commitment scheme called Behemoth with constant-size opening proofs and a constant-time verifier. The downside of Behemoth is that it employs a cubic prover in the degree of the committed polynomial. We prove the security of our scheme in the generic group model and discuss parameter settings in which it remains practical even for the prover
ethp2psim: Evaluating and deploying privacy-enhanced peer-to-peer routing protocols for the Ethereum network
Network-level privacy is the Achilles heel of financial privacy in
cryptocurrencies. Financial privacy amounts to achieving and maintaining
blockchain- and network-level privacy. Blockchain-level privacy recently
received substantial attention. Specifically, several privacy-enhancing
technologies were proposed and deployed to enhance blockchain-level privacy. On
the other hand, network-level privacy, i.e., privacy on the peer-to-peer layer,
has seen far less attention and development. In this work, we aim to provide a
peer-to-peer network simulator, ethp2psim, that allows researchers to evaluate
the privacy guarantees of privacy-enhanced broadcast and message routing
algorithms. Our goal is two-fold. First, we want to enable researchers to
implement their proposed protocols in our modular simulator framework. Second,
our simulator allows researchers to evaluate the privacy guarantees of
privacy-enhanced routing algorithms. Finally, ethp2psim can help choose the
right protocol parameters for efficient, robust, and private deployment
Naysayer proofs
This work introduces the notion of naysayer proofs. We observe that in numerous (zero-knowledge) proof systems, it is significantly more efficient for the verifier to be convinced by a so-called naysayer that a false proof is invalid than it is to check that a genuine proof is valid. We show that every NP language has constant-size and constant-time naysayer proofs. We also show practical constructions for several example proof systems, including FRI polynomial commitments, post-quantum secure digital signatures, and verifiable shuffles. Naysayer proofs enable an interesting new optimistic verification mode potentially suitable for resource-constrained verifiers, such as smart contracts
The Effect of False Positives: Why Fuzzy Message Detection Leads to Fuzzy Privacy Guarantees?
Fuzzy Message Detection (FMD) is a recent cryptographic primitive invented by Beck et al. (CCS\u2721) where an untrusted server performs coarse message filtering for its clients in a recipient-anonymous way. In FMD --- besides the true positive messages --- the clients download from the server their cover messages determined by their false-positive detection rates. What is more, within FMD, the server cannot distinguish between genuine and cover traffic. In this paper, we formally analyze the privacy guarantees of FMD from three different angles. First, we analyze three privacy provisions offered by FMD: recipient unlinkability, relationship anonymity, and temporal detection ambiguity. Second, we perform a differential privacy analysis and coin a relaxed definition to capture the privacy guarantees FMD yields. Finally, we simulate FMD on real-world communication data. Our theoretical and empirical results assist FMD users in adequately selecting their false-positive detection rates for various applications with given privacy requirements
CryptoWills: How to Bequeath Cryptoassets
In this paper, we put forth the problem of bequeathing cryptoassets. In this problem, a testator wishes to bequeath cryptoassets - e.g. secrets, static keys or cryptocurrency - to their heirs. Crucially, the testator should retain control of their assets before their passing. Additionally testator needs to maintain privacy, i.e. beneficiaries must not learn the bequest, moreover, beneficiaries must not be able to determine whether they will inherit at all before testator\u27s decease. We formally define the security goals of a cryptographic will (cryptowill) protocol and subsequently present schemes fulfilling the required security properties